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**The Effect of Auction Design on Individual Bidding Strategies in Multi-Unit Auctions**

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This study contributes to the ongoing empirical examination of the uniform price and discriminatory price auction. Unlike existing empirical work that uses aggregate data, this study makes use of data at the individual bidder level and speaks to the effects of auction design on individual bidding strategies. In particular, the data set examined consists of a natural experiment in which the format of the Ontario dairy quota auction switches from a uniform to a discriminatory pricing rule. Bidders are tracked across both auction formats to analyze the effect of auction design on particular components of their individual bid schedules. Preliminary analysis focus on the subset of bidders that bid in both the October 2006 auction and the December 2006 auction: before and after the change in auction format from uniform to discriminatory that occurred in November. Results suggest auction design has a significant effect on bidders' bidding strategies in terms of strategic manipulations of bids. In particular, bidders in the uniform auction are more likely to submit flat bid schedules, whereas bid schedules submitted under the discriminatory auction are more likely to be downward sloping. These results have implications for auction design in terms of explaining adjustments in auction revenue or efficiency of allocation caused from a change in auction format by changes in individual bidding strategies.